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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through : 
LAYTON CITY, BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
: Case No. 930130-CA 
v. 
ROBERT D. ALSTON, Argument Priority No, 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
This appeal arises from a jury verdict and conviction in the 
Second Circuit Court Layton Department. Pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d), the Utah Court of Appeals has appellate 
jurisdiction over criminal appeals from the circuit courts. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
This Court is presented with the following issues on appeal: 
1. Whether the jury instructions fairly tendered the case 
to the jury. 
2. Whether the facts set forth at trial were sufficient to 
support the jury's guilty verdict.1 
Defendant/Appellant states issue (1) as follows: "The facts 
as alleged at trial do not constitute the offense for which 
[Defendant/Appellant] was convicted." A review of the argument on 
this issue reveals that the issue is actually whether the City set 
forth evidence sufficient to establish every element of the case. 
The Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence presented 
at trial to show that he did not act with legal privilege when he 
stabbed and killed a six month old husky-malamute puppy. In State 
1 
3. Whether the trial court erred in admitting canine 
autopsy photographs. 
4. Whether Defendant received effective assistance of 
counsel. 
5. Whether the transcript is sufficient to allow the Court 
to adequately review the proceedings below. 
6. Whether the Court should address constitutional issues 
not raised below and, if so, whether the statute under which 
defendant was convicted is constitutional. 
7. Whether the proceedings were cumulatively so flawed as 
to justify extraordinary relief. 
The standard of review for each of the issues presented is 
as follows: 
Jury Instructions. This Court must insure that the 
Defendant's theory of the case was adequately presented to the 
jury. Jury instructions state the law of the case, presenting a 
question of law which the Court will review for correctness. 
State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 1992). However, in 
reviewing for correctness the Court must review the jury 
instructions as a whole. This court has ruled that it will 
v. James, 819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1991). The defendant filed motions 
for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for recording 
conviction of the next lower category of offense based upon the 
alleged lack of evidence showing an intentional and knowing 
killing, an essential element of the first degree murder charge for 
which he was convicted. The Utah Supreme Court found that motions 
based upon the alleged lack of evidence as to certain elements of 
the offense were essentially challenges to the sufficiency of the 
evidence. Therefore, issues (1) and (2) raised in Defendant's 
brief are both claims of insufficiency of the evidence and will be 
treated as such for purposes of this appeal. 
2 
affirm when the instructions taken as a whole, "fairly tender the 
case to the jury," even where "one or more of the instructions, 
standing alone, are not as full or accurate as they might have 
been." State v. Garrett, 207 Utah Adv. Reps. 45 (Utah App. 1993). 
(citing State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah App. 1991) 
(citations omitted)). 
Sufficiency of the Evidence. This Court has consistently 
reiterated that when reviewing a jury verdict the Court views the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light 
most favorable to the verdict. State v. Dunn, 208 Utah Adv. Rep. 
100 (Utah App. 1993). It is only when the evidence, as viewed in 
this light, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable 
that a jury must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to the 
defendant's guilt that it is proper to overturn the conviction. 
State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1991). 
Admission of Evidence. In reviewing a trial court's ruling 
on the admissibility of evidence under Utah R. Evid. 403, this 
Court will not overturn the lower court's determination unless it 
was an "abuse of discretion." State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 
239-240 (Utah 1992); see State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116,120 (Utah 
1989); State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1986). An abuse 
of discretion will be found only if the trial court's finding 
that the evidence was admissible was "beyond the limits of 
reasonability." Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 240. 
If this Court finds that the trial court's decision to admit 
was "beyond the limits of reasonability," the verdict will 
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reversed only if Defendant can show that, absent the error, there 
is a reasonable likelihood that the outcome would have been more 
favorable to the defendant, Dunn, 208 Utah Adv. Reps, at 109. 
(citing Hamilton, P.2d at 240; Verde, 770 P.2d at 121. 
Effective Assistance of Counsel. The Court must determine, 
as a matter of law2, whether defense counsel's performance 
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.3 Vigil# Id. 
However, the defendant bears the burden of showing the trial 
counsel's performance was deficient and that defendant suffered 
unfair prejudice as a result of the alleged deficiencies. Vigil, 
Id. (citing State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990); 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698, 194 S.Ct. 2052, 
2070, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401,405 
(Utah 1986)). 
Adequacy of Trial Transcript. This Court has ruled that the 
"mere existence of [transcription errors] does not mandate a new 
trial." The defendant must make a showing of prejudice before 
the court will overturn a conviction on the basis of 
2When the Court does not have findings of fact, "the record . 
. . allows us to determine on appeal, as a matter of law, whether 
defense counsel's performance constituted ineffective counsel." 
State v. Vigil, 840 P.2d 788 (Utah App. 1992) (citing State v. 
Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 487 (Utah App. 1991) 
3Although ineffective assistance of counsel claims must 
usually be addressed by collateral attack through habeas corpus 
proceedings, in limited circumstances, the claim may raised on 
direct appeal. State v. Vigil, 840 P.2d 788 (Utah .App. 
1992)(citations omitted). One of those circumstances is present in 
the case at bar as there is new counsel on appeal. State v. 
Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 487 (Utah App. 1991). Therefore, this issue 
is properly before the Court. 
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transcription errors. State v. Menzies, 182 Utah Adv. Reps. 3 
(Utah App. 1992). 
Constitutional Issues Not Raised Below. Constitutional 
issues may not be asserted for the first time on appeal unless 
the Defendant can demonstrate "plain error" cnr "exceptional 
circumstances." State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 925 (Utah App. 
1991). Legislative enactments are presumed to be constitutional 
and Defendant bears the burden of demonstrating 
unconstitutionality. State v. Pharris, 204 Utah Adv. Rep 39 
(Utah 1993); Greenwood v. North Salt Lake, 817 .2d 816 (Utah 
1991). Furthermore, a statute will be found void for vagueness 
only if the statute fails to define the "offense with sufficient 
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is 
prohibited . Id. 
Cumulative Error. Cumulative error is to be reviewed under 
a correction of error standard. However, Defendant must show a 
cumulative effect of individual errors which prejudiced his or 
her right to a fair trial. State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135, 
1146 (Utah 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTE AND RULES 
U.S. Const, amend. VI 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV 
Utah Const, art. I, § 7 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-301 
Utah R. Evid. 403 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information and summons for 
violating Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-301, cruelty to animals, Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-206, criminal trespass, and Utah Code Ann. § 76-
6-106, criminal mischief, all class C misdemeanors. The criminal 
mischief charge was dismissed prior to trial. The matter came on 
for jury trial January 28 and 29, 1992. The jury returned a 
verdict of not guilty on the charge of criminal trespass. 
Defendant was found guilty of cruelty to animals. 
This appeal stems from the jury verdict and proceedings at 
trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the Summer of 1992, Tony and Amy Salazar acquired two 
puppies—Blackjack, a black labrador, and Dottie Girl, a black 
and gray husky-malamute mix. (Trial Transcript pages 25-
26)(hereinafter ("T.")). Dottie Girl was described by Amy 
Salazar and others as friendly, sweet-natured, outgoing and 
playful. (T. 28, 117) Dottie Girl regularly played with the 
Salazars' two year-old daughter as well as other children in the 
neighborhood. (T. 28-19) Amy testified that, to her knowledge, 
Dottie Girl had only been out of the fenced back yard twice when 
the Salazars where not home. (T. 53) After the first incident, 
the Salazars took extra precautions to ensure that Dottie would 
not get out. (T. 152)4 
4Tony Salazar testified that he placed two garbage can lids 
and then garbage cans up against the fence gate. He then put a 
small swamp cooler in front of the garbage cans. The gate itself 
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On October 3, 1992, Tony and Amy left their home at 695 
Cowley, in Layton to go to a family barbecue. They left their 
daughter, Sydney with a babysitter. Before leaving, at 
approximately 5:00 p.m., Tony checked the gate to make sure it 
was secure. (T. 152) Amy returned at 7:20 and was at home for 
about ten minutes. Amy left her home at about 7:30 p.m. to pick 
up her husband in Kaysville and take the babysitter home. (T. 37, 
41) Before leaving the residence, Amy saw that her dogs, 
Blackjack, then 4 months old, and Dottie Girl, then 6 months old, 
were in the fenced backyard. (T. 40) 
A neighbor, Cookie Perkins, testified that she walked around 
the Salazarfs block from 7:30 to 8:00 p.m. the night of October 
3. Perkins observed the Salazar dogs on the Salazar's back steps 
inside the fenced yard. (T. 64-65) 
At approximately 8:40 p.m., neighbor Richard Huff drove past 
the Salazar residence. As Huff drove past the house, he noticed 
the Defendant, who lives just north of the Salazar residence, 
standing inside the Salazars' front yard approximately eight 
feet. (R. 85-87) Defendant did not move or turn to make eye 
contact as Huff drove past the home. Defendant just stood, 
facing east, staring straight ahead. (T. 87) Huff continued to 
his own home three homes east of the Salazar residence. Huff did 
not see any dogs as he passed the Salazar residence. (T. 97) 
Approximately fifteen (15) minutes after Huff arrived home, 
was wrapped with a cable and clipped with a spring loaded clip so 
the gate could not open accidently. (T.152) 
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Huff heard a "dog yelping in agony." Three or four minutes later 
Huff heard the yelping again. Huff investigated and found the 
Salazarsf puppy in a neighbors yard to the east. He immediately 
recognized the puppy as Dottie Girl, the Salazarsf Husky Malamute 
puppy. The dog was obviously injured and in a great deal of 
pain. (T. 89) Huff attempted to contact the Salazars' but no one 
was home. Huff called Davis County Animal Control to respond to 
the scene. (T. 90) 
The Salazars and Officer Brad Lee, Animal Control Officer 
both came to the area at about 9:30 p.m. After a cursory 
examination of the puppy, Huff, the Salazars and Officer Lee all 
concluded that the puppy had been hit by a car. Huff and Tony 
Salazar loaded the puppy into the back of Huff's pick-up and took 
her to the veterinary hospital where Dr. Richard Winward had 
agreed to meet them. (T. 92-93, 119) Officer Lee remained behind 
to question Amy Salazar. 
Dr. Winward examined Dottie Girl (T. 106) and discovered 
that the injuries were actually stab wounds. Dr. Winward found 
one severe puncture wound underneath the right eye and through 
the eye socket, (T. 120), two stab wounds in the right shoulder, 
one in the right forearm and two fatal wounds to the left side of 
the abdomen totaling six stab wounds. (T. 121) Dottie Girl was 
taken off life support and she dies a short time later. Dr. 
Winward relayed information relating to the dogfs condition to 
Officer Lee while Lee was at the Salazar home. (T. 105) Officer 
Lee responded to the animal hospital to verify Dr. Winwardfs 
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telephoned information. While at the animal hospital, Officer 
Lee received another call from Davis County Dispatch indicating 
there was a dog bite victim at Davis North Hospital Emergency 
Room. Officer Lee responded to Davis North. (T.108) 
Upon arrival at Davis North, Officer Lee made contact with 
the Defendant. Following Davis County Animal Control protocol, 
Officer Lee asked the Defendant if he, Lee, could see Defendant's 
wounds. Defendant would not allow Officer Lee to examine the 
wounds as they were bandaged and sterile. Officer Lee then 
inquired of the Defendant as to the facts leading to his 
injuries. Defendant would not respond to Lee's questions, but 
simply sat silent. (T. 109-110) 
Realizing that there may be a connection between the two 
incidents, and having information that a weapon was involved, 
Officer Lee contacted Layton Police department and requested that 
an officer respond to assist in the investigation. (T. 110-111) 
Patrol Officer Stephen E. Hein, Layton Police Department 
responded to Davis North Medical Center. (T. 128) After advising 
Defendant of his rights, per Miranda, Officer Hein spoke with the 
Defendant about the incident. (T. 129) Defendant told Officer 
Hein that he was walking home about 8:30 p.m. when a small black 
dog came up to him and was nipping at his heels. He stated he 
kicked the small black dog. At that point, another dog, which he 
described as a Husky-type dog ran up and started biting at his 
legs and feet. Defendant stated that he kicked at the dog and 
then bent down to grab the dog at which point the dog bit him. 
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He threw the dog down, the dog left and he continued home where 
he asked his wife to take him to the hospital. (R. 112, 129-130.) 
During the interview with Defendant, Officer Hein noticed a 
strong order of alcohol coming from Defendant's breath. (T. 130) 
(Defendant later testified that he had consumed six to eight 
beers in the two hour period, just prior to the incident.) (T. 
225) There were no scuff marks, or tears in Defendant's pant 
legs. (T. 134). Defendant was wearing steel-toed boots. (T. 131) 
Hein also noticed that the Defendant was wearing a folding 
pocketknife with a four inch blade in a sheath on his belt. (T. 
130) Defendant allowed Officer Hein to examine the knife. 
Officer Hein observed white or gray hairs in the hinge 
mechanism of the blade. Officer Hein also noticed there were 
small specks of blood on the blade itself and inside the handle 
into which the blade folded. (T. 131) Officer Hein asked the 
Defendant if he had used the knife recently to cut any meat. The 
Defendant answered "no." (T. 132) 
Officer Hein then told the Defendant that a witness had 
observed the Defendant stab the dog. Defendant adamantly denied 
the accusation. (T. 132) Officer Hein relayed the condition of 
Dottie Girl to the Defendant and again asked if the Defendant had 
recently used the knife. The Defendant then stated that he had 
the knife out during the attack, but that he didn't believe he 
had stabbed the dog. (T. 132) Officer Hein took the knife as 
evidence. 
Officer Hein then proceeded to the Salazar residence. Tony 
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Salazar reported to Officer Hein that when he and his wife had 
returned to their home earlier in the evening they had found the 
gate to their back yard open. (T. 136) Tony stated that the gate 
was strongly secured to keep the dogs in the back yard. (T. 136-
137) Officer Hein examined the area for blood and did find blood 
trails attributable to both Defendant and the puppy. However, he 
could not identify the exact location of the attack. (T. 137-
139.) 
At trial Defendant told a different version of the events of 
October 3. Defendant testified that he was walking home on the 
night of October 3, when he was attacked by the Salazarsf dogs. 
He stated that the husky-malamute puppy was nipping at his heels 
so he reached down to push it away. He testified that the puppy 
then latched onto his arm. Defendant lifted his arm and the 
puppy continued to hang from his arm. Defendant testified that 
the dog hung from his arm for twenty to thirty seconds before he 
decided to use his knife. (T. 214) He stated he pulled out his 
knife and "stuck the dog . . . only two or three times." (T. 200) 
The dog then let go of Defendant's arm, hit the ground and ran 
towards the Salazars' house. (T. 199-200). He then proceeded 
home and had his wife drive him to the hospital for treatment of 
his own injuries.5 
5Dr. Davenport, Davis North Hospital Emergency Room Doctor, 
testified that he treated Defendant for one laceration and .four 
puncture wounds on Defendant's hands and arm. Dr. Davenport 
testified that there were no injuries to Defendant's legs at the 
time of the examination at the hospital at 9:10 p.m. October 3, 
1992. (R. 83) (See Also Exhibit D-l) However, Defendant testified 
to injuries on his leg and place photos into evidence showing a 
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Defendant further testified that Dottie Girl barked at him 
when he would walk past the Salazar residence and that the 
barking "annoyed" him (T. 221) He said that Dottie Girl ran free 
"daily," (T. 228) that the puppy had "come at" him a couple of 
times,(T. 222-223) but that he was "not extensively" afraid of 
the dog. (T. 223) Cookie Perkins, on the other hand, testified 
that she walked past the Salazar residence at least eight times a 
day, five days a week, (T. 61-62) that Dottie Girl occasionally 
barked at her, but that the puppy never jumped on the fence 
towards Perkins. (T. 67) Perkins further testified that she had 
never seen Dottie Girl running loose in the neighborhood. (T.68) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The jury received instruction on two different legal 
privileges. The instructions did not conflict and, when read 
together with the other instructions, adequately presented the 
Defendant's theory of the case to the jury. 
The facts set forth at trial were sufficient to support the 
jury's guilty verdict. Evidence was presented to allow the jury 
to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, every element of the offense. 
Photographs of a canine autopsy were properly admitted into 
evidence. Even if this court finds that the trial court erred in 
admitting the photographs, the admission of the photographs was 
harmless error. 
puncture type wound to one of his legs. 
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Defendant received effective ^^istance counsel. 
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animal without legal privilege, . . . 
Privilege is a right held by a person against or beyond the 
course of the law.6 "Legal privilege" used in the context of 
Section 76-9-301 could take many different forms. For example, 
an animal control officer may have a legal privilege to kill an 
animal, without the consent of the owner, if the animal has been 
determined to be a threat to public health or safety (e.g. 
disease, rabies, etc.). A veterinarian could have a legal 
privilege to kill an injured, dying animal, without the consent 
of the owner, as a humanitarian act. 
The jurors were instructed on two of the possible privileges 
available to Defendant. The jurors were instructed that an 
individual has a privilege to use force and violence in self 
defense, where it appears to be reasonably necessary to protect 
against a threatened injury.7 This was clearly a proper 
instruction as Defendant claimed he acted in self defense when he 
stabbed the puppy. This instruction placed the Defendant's 
theory of the case before the jury and adequately apprised the 
6Blackfs Law Dictionary 5th Ed. 
7That instruction reads as follows: 
You are instructed that an individual may, in self 
defense, use that amount of force which appears to be 
reasonably necessary, under the circumstances, for 
protection against a threatened injury. This privilege 
to use force and violence in self defense ceases after 
the assailant is helpless, or all danger is clearly past. 
(See Jury Instruction No. 11 attached as Exhibit 1) 
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•  vib iiu evidence before * *> v suggesting extraordinary 
cumstances undci 1 
, * * possible p !v1 j> aside from valid defense 
oresenteo u *u Defendant, would - m v i l e g e 
permissi , ^ . ^ nwn^r-
L » f h: ; i i ^  i J «- -J « . 
r^ c e n d a n t - • - G r i z z l e v » Stat e , ' Mi' fOk) -L . . 
App. 198b, uo u ici ru; i; ', 
Grizzle is factually distinguishable i Grizzle, the tiia± 
The Appellate v. vie*•-.,. , ..;:. i -. . g: 
The tridl properly instructed the jury on 
appellant .heory <~>f defense that there was 1' ^ 1 
8The instruction reads as i i: 
Legal privilege means freedom to do what the law entitles 
you to do. For purposes of this case, it means one's 
right to exercise control over or decide the use or 
disposition of one's property. 
( ittached -' Exhibi 
9See Utah Code Ann . . . _ j 
Tim"11 ff , Definitions: 
(1) "Property" means anything c f value , ii ic] udi i: lg . . . 
domestic animals. 
cause for shooting the dog, . . . However, the trial 
court confused the jury when it rendered its 
instructions concerning the defense of others, . . • 
[Based on the instruction} it would be impossible for 
the jury to determine whether the "aggressor" were to 
be determined as between Grizzle, Jr. and Chronister or 
as between the dog and Grizzle Jr. 
Grizzle, 707 P.2d at 213. The facts at trial showed that 
Grizzle, Jr. was an aggressor against Chronister and that 
Chronisterfs dog had come to the aid of his master. In Grizzle, 
the possibility for confusion was apparent and the matter was 
properly remanded for a new trial. 
In the case at bar, only one instruction on the privilege of 
self-defense was given. The jury was also instructed on the 
privilege of property ownership. There is clearly no conflict 
between the two as the instructions address two separate 
privileges recognized by the law. There could be no confusion 
arising from the two instructions as the facts showed that 
Defendant did not have legal privilege to kill the puppy by 
permission of the property owner. (T. 156-157) Therefore, the 
only privilege left to the Defendant was that of self-defense. 
Defendant's theory of the case was fairly presented to the jury 
in a clear and understandable way, Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 238. 
Even if the trial court erred in giving instructions on two 
separate privileges, it was harmless error. This Court will 
affirm when the instructions taken as a whole, "fairly tender the 
case to the jury" even where "one or more of the instructions, 
standing alone, are not as full or accurate as they might have 
been." Perdue, 813 P.2d at 1203. (citations omitted). The jury 
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was instructed to consider inst ructions as a 
who I n , t i n t " c a r h i in I i in I -
part ol I "": vl.:.iv m . ». ^entenc* . ^ i i u a i o n 
w a s intendec *•• state ' w h o l e *f i'•'-. *a* lpon any 
^ -rticular poi~ * ' I 
w h o l e , :li t :i s cleat LI.. actions tail, tendered *se 
t' D" tl: le jii lry The Defendant should not be granted - n-- r rial , 
POINT II: THE FACTS SET FORTH AT TRIAL SUPPORT THE 
JURY'S GUILTY VERDICT. 
This Court has consistently reiterated that when reviewing a 
j mi i mi \ • P i r! i r f •" hi i I" in mi mi I i i " I  in II II mi i in • • • 
inferences drawn therefrom favorable the 
verdict. State v. Dunn, 208 Utah Adv. Rep ' r 1993). 
> 
sufficiently * . nherently improbable that ;" 
must have entertained a i easonable doubt as t « M*» defendant « 
James, trvie-L the facts 
presented shows cleai-i^ in^l UA-_ evidence presented was 
1(1
 J-.: • v Instruct] or, • ^ ads as f oi ] ows " 
These instructions, tnougn numbered separately, are to be 
considered and construed as one connected whole. Each 
instruction should be read and understood in reference to 
and as a part of the entire group of instructions and not 
as though any one sentence or instruction separately were 
intended to state the whole law of the case upon any 
particular point. Moreover, the order in which the 
instructions are given has no significance as their 
relative importance. 
(See Jury Instruction Nc. 21 attached as Exhibit *7. 
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not so inconclusive or improbable as to raise reasonable doubt as 
to Defendant's guilt. 
Defendant was seen in the Salazars' yard only minutes before 
Dottie Girl was stabbed. The gate to the back yard had been 
deliberately opened. Defendant was evasive when questioned at 
the hospital about the events leading to his injuries and 
adamantly denied having stabbed the dog. However, circumstantial 
evidence was overwhelming that Dottie Girl was stabbed with the 
knife found in possession of the Defendant and that she was the 
same dog that caused Defendant's slight injuries. Dottie Girl 
had been stabbed six times and ultimately died from the stab 
wounds. The owner of the Dog had not given the Defendant 
permission to kill the animal. This evidence is clearly 
sufficient to establish a prima facia case of cruelty to animals. 
The City concedes that if Defendant was attacked by the dog, 
he had a legal privilege, and therefore a valid defense, to use 
reasonable force to ward of the attack.11 However, the evidence 
11Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-401(1), Justification of Defense - When 
allowed. 
(1) "When the actor's conduct is in defense of persons o 
property under the circumstances described in sections 76-2-
402 . . . of this part." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402(1), Force in defense of person -
Forcible Felony Defined. 
(1) "A person is justified in threatening or using force 
against another when and to the extent that he reasonably 
believes that such force is necessary to defend himself or a 
third person against such other's imminent use of unlawful 
force; however, a person is justified in using force which is 
intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury 
only if he reasonably believes that the force is necessary to 
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showed * *• • Defendant did not ac t within the perimeter of self 
i - ; ; c . s z- ::  i i f ] ill • :::: t : ::i i: l g in I nil i Il I In 
dog ana II ; ropensji attack, and Defendant1s testimony 
differed from the vision of facts he presented f ^  the 
I II I I ' " i I J (j 1 1 I II II ' • S 
evidence pointJ? - Defendant's qui; ill 
This Court has stated t^a* weigh conflicting 
witnesses < :f • • State v. Sherard, 818 P.2d 554 
(Utah App. 1990) The jury =»-•••:--^  *. finding agent, 
adopt 
prosecutici theory ' the case r because they concluded that 
Defendant { ~ ^ ~f i} - confines oi bcxi defense.12 
Defendant further contends rnrn thoio !s insufficient 
evidence * n show the4" u- ' ~* "••'ionally ui knowingl- ---zed the 
deati , *>P puppy. »upreme Court nas 1IL-LU L:.at 
evidence "f inters deduced from the nature •ne act 
itse]* m e inference is made * ' * the natural consequences of 
that W P T P intendea vn occur- james a » very 
nature « t •.->•. r , acts easonable jury could determine that the 
prevent death or serious t>ocjiiy injury to himself or a third 
person, or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony." 
^Detendant seems to overlook the possibility that the jury did 
accept his version of the facts, but simply concluded that his 
actions of self defense went beyond the limits of reasonability 
when he stabbed the dog the second, thi r d, four th, fi f th and six th 
H me -
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acts were committed with the requisite intent for the crime 
charged." James at 791. Defendant stabbed the puppy six times. 
It was not unreasonable for the jury to conclude that Defendant 
intended to kill the animal. 
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the evidence 
presented at trial was sufficient to sustain the conviction. The 
jury's verdict should stand. 
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN THE SCOPE OF 
ITS DISCRETION IN ADMITTING CANINE AUTOPSY PHOTOGRAPHS. 
Trial Courts have broad discretion in admitting or excluding 
evidence under Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. This 
Court will reverse a court's decision to admit evidence only if 
the court's findings was beyond the limits of reasonability, 
Dunn, at 109 (citing Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232), and the defendant 
was prejudiced by the admission of the evidence. Dunn, at 109. 
Utah R. Evid 403. When determining whether evidence is 
admissible, it is necessary to determine first whether the 
proffered evidence has an unusual propensity to unfairly 
prejudice, inflame, or mislead the jury. (State v. Dibello, 780 
P.2d 1221, 1229 (Utah 1989). 
It is clear that gruesome photographs of homicide victims 
could be unfairly prejudicial. Photographs of open wounds, 
excessive blood, mutilation and deformity can be extremely 
gruesome. State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 303 (Utah 1992); Dunn, 
208 Utah Adv. Rep. at 109. However, the "gruesomeness" of such 
photographs stems primarily from the fact that they are 
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photographs «- v beings- someone's mother, rh-1-" * loved 
f ::!' = •] ill i igs si ii!]:: ] ] i In i when • 
viewing photographs ot animals The Court should apply neither 
the Allen/Dunn defini t ions - gruesome established for 
photographs ' ... * nresumption of 
inadmissibility t photographs of animals. 
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defini t i 01: is jruesome i , hotograpn.. ..nimals, the 
photographs :: *? properly admitted. The 
m a j i •' 
amounts blood , ; wound ances- s ^ different 
cuts about one inch width. Only two photographs show the 
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photographs made .
 : -, a .-,- i*». i&iuu biiuwu 
iiese * >"v photographs war- md if r^ t h •- veterinarian and that 
Defendant, 39-140) (Se^ * * ini exhibit T x 
photographs - question • ^ ^ \^p\\ blood, 
were takei :i ill i I a stei:i 1 e operating room ei Iv I ronment that :i in: I i io way 
suggests a crime scene, Tl: le photographs were corroborative 
that the dog w as stabbed si x times. 
The photographs could be comparer! \r t » n*. • -sk^ r f thp 
Cobb, the Utah Supreme Court ruled t. nai a photograph the 
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homicide victim's body which had been washed and sutured, was 
"relatively clear of blood," and showing only the area where the 
wounds were inflicted was not gruesome. Cobb, 774 at 1125. 
Similarly the photographs of the animal autopsy in this case are 
not gruesome. 
Even if these photographs are determined to be gruesome by 
this Court, the error does not justify reversal. Defendant bears 
the burden of showing that there was a reasonable likelihood that 
absent the error, the result would have been more favorable to 
the defendant. State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221 (Utah 1989). 
There is nothing in this case that suggests, absent the admission 
of the photographs, the result would have been more favorable to 
the Defendant. 
The trial Court in this case did review the pictures and 
properly admitted them.13 
POINT IV: DEFENDANT RECEIVED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL 
Defendant argues that he was denied effective assistance of 
counsel because his trial counsel failed to adequately object to 
the jury instruction on legal privilege of a property owner, and 
to the admission of canine autopsy photographs. In order to 
13Counsel for Plaintiff stated "I suppose the Court would like 
to see [the pictures]." The Court state, "The Court hasn't looked 
at those. But based on the testimony, the Court overrules the 
objection to Exhibits P-l-A through—what, H? oh, K I guess, except 
G. Dr. Winward's testimony was the G didn't impart any information. 
It's a blur. The Court feels that the others are appropriate. . . 
." The Court reviewed the pictures as it ruled. The comment 
"It's a blur," indicates the Court was looking at the pictures at 
time it was ruling. 
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prevail nn thin t I 11 in Defendant must s 
Deiluiii i I,L13 II I i i iefendant prejudiced by the 
deficient performance. Vigil, 840 P.2o ~\ 7-' u-itma State v. 
Templin, *0'* o 2d 182 (Utah 1990); Striikicii— . ,\^».-.Acu~. 
•lo up-4 M r j Titf i i defendant must identify specific 
instances wher^ * ! counsel 
standara reasonableness. Vigil, l_d. iciung Templin, 
Id.; Strickland, Id.) defendant must then show that there is a 
reasonable probability that but 
je i: f ormance, the jury would have acquitted the Defendant. Vigil, 
Id. . 
Defendant e 
inrv insi-mrfi^ photographs lbbiif h. objections went 
1
 >•- > , 3 >- - Defendan argument? teal 14: Even if 
U"" '*- LL wet "" I s 
objecti*. ns wer- >* perfectic » . Defendant must still 
show prejudice. iefendant ^ilpH j r.-.. < * a showing. 
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 ses I he issues 
r><
 r. L , « .eiitjiuve assistance ^f counsel, "a 
common standard : applicable." State v. Ellifritz, P?!S P 2d J./W 
(Utah App, 1QQ' [ lg V e r d e, 1 7 0 F 
claims require u .. nowing that, absent the error, there is a 
14The fact that defendant's trial counsel did not argue that 
the photos were presumptively prejudicial and therefore required a 
showing by the City of unusual, probative value, is not reversible 
error since that is not establish lav with regard to canine autopsy 
nhotographs. 
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substantial likelihood of a more favorable outcome for defendant, 
Failure to meet the plain error requirement of prejudice means 
that defendant also fails to meet the required showing under the 
ineffective assistance of counsel standard. Ellifritz, Id. 
Defendant has failed to show plain error. (See arguments set 
forth in POINT I and POINT II above.) Therefore, Defendant's 
arguments claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must fail. 
POINT V: THE TRANSCRIPT ADEQUATELY SETS FORTH THE 
PROCEEDINGS BELOW. 
This Court has ruled that the "mere existence of 
[transcription errors] does not mandate a new trial." The 
defendant must make a showing of prejudice before the court will 
overturn a conviction on the basis of transcription errors. State 
v. Menzies, 182 Utah Adv. Reps. 3 (Utah App. 1992). Defendant 
has failed to show any prejudice arising from errors or omissions 
in the court transcript. The trial transcript is 272 pages long 
and covers virtually every aspect of the trial. The minor errors 
and omission in no way affect this Court's ability to review the 
proceedings below. The errors and omissions are so negligible 
that no prejudice arises. 
POINT VI: CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES NOT RAISED BELOW SHOULD 
NOT BE ADDRESSED, 
Defendant claims the statute under which he was convicted is 
constitutionally void for vagueness or overbreadth. However, 
these issues are presented for the first time on appeal. This 
Court has ruled that a defendant may not assert a constitutional 
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POINT VII: DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO SHOW ANY ERRORS 
SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF 
The arguments set forth above show that there were - cnuis 
committed di :.re, 
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Defendant's cumulative error argument fails. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant has failed to show any basis for reversal of 
the jury's guilty verdict entered against him. The City 
respectfully requests the Court to affirm Defendant's conviction, 
Dated this ^ ^ ' ^ d a y of June# 1993. 
& . 
NE H. ELLER 
orney for Plaintiff-Appellee 
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ADDENDUM 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT VI 
Rights of Accused, In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause 
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT XIV 
(1) Citizenship - Due process of law - Equal protection. All 
persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and 
of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I 
Section 7 Due Process of Law. No person shall be deprived of 
life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
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STATUTE 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-301 - Cruelty to Animals. 
(1) A person commits cruelty to animals if he 
intentionally, knowingly, or with criminal negligence: 
* * * 
(f) kills, injures, or administers poison to an 
animal without legal privilege. . . . 
29 
RULE 
UTAH R. EVID. 40 3 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
30 
EXHIBIT ONE 
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NO. 
DUTIES OF JUDGE AND JURY 
Members of the Jury: 
It is the duty of the court to instruct you in the law that 
applies to this case, and it your duty as jurors to follow the 
law as the court state^L it to you, regardless of what you 
personally believe the law is or ought to be. On the other 
hand, it is your exclusive province to determine the facts in 
the case, and to consider and weigh the evidence for that 
purpose. 
The authority thus vested in you is not an arbitrary power, 
but must be exercised with sincere judgment, sound discretion, 
and in accordance with rules of law state to you. 
NO. 2 -
ONE DEFENDANT 
The defendant, ROBERT p. ALSTON , is charged with two offenses, 
tO-wit: (1) CRUELTY TO ANIMALS, a Class C Misdemeanor. 
(2) CRIMINAL TRESPASS, a Class C Misdemeanor. 
It is your duty to determine, as to each charge, whether the defendant is 
guilty of the offenses charged. While the charges are being tried jointly, it 
nevertheless becomes your solemn duty to judge the guilt or innocence on each 
charge, and at the close of these instructions the court will submit to you 
separate verdicts regarding the guilt or innocence on each charge. 
if/ 
NO. 3 
STATEMENT OF CHARGE NOT STATEMENT OF FACT 
The foreqoing instructions are not to be regarded as statements 
of facts proved in this case, but are to be considered merely as sum-
marized statements of the accusations aaainst the defendant. 
NO. f 
DEFENDANT BEING CHARGED AMD HELD TO ANSWER 
NO EVIDENCE OF GUILT 
The fact that the defendant has been charged with offenses and 
has been held to answer thereto is not to be reaarded as any evidence 
of his auilt and no inference or oresumption adverse to him should be 
drawn because of these facts. 
NO. 
DEFENDANT'S PLEA OF NOT GUILTY PUTS BURDEN ON STATE 
The defendant has entered pleas of not guilty to the charqes of: 
(1) CRUELTY TO ANIMALS 
(2) CRIMINAL TRESPASS 
This casts upon the !S8te (or City) the burden of provina beyond a 
reasonable doubt all of the elements of each offense charged which 
elements are set forth in Instruction No. G . . 
L NO. 
DEFINITION OF OFFENSE AND ELEMENTS OF OFFENSE 
Before you can convict the defendant of the offense of 
CRUELTY TO ANIMALS 
you must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the 
following elements of that offense. 
1. That the defendant injured or caused the death of a dog, 
2. That he did so intentionally or knowingly, 
3. That he did so without legal privilege* and 
4. That such acts occurred in Lay ton City on October 3, 1992. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and all of the 
essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your 
duty to convict the defendant. On the other hand, if the evidence has failed 
to so establish one or more of said elements then you should find the 
defendant not guilty. 
NO. X 
INTENT 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent with respect to the 
nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, 
when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage 
in the conduct or cause the resuult. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge with respect to his 
conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct 
when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the 
existing circumstances. 
Intent, being a state of mind, is seldom susceptible of 
proof by direct and positive evidence and may ordinarily be 
inferred fromacts, conduct, statements and circumstances. 
No. ( 
DEFINITION OF LEGAL PRIVILEGE 
Legal privilege means freedom to do what the law 
entitles you to do. For purposes of this case, it means 
one's right to exercise control over or decide the use 
or disposition of one's property. 
HO. 10 
DEFINITION OF OFFENSE AND ELEMENTS OF OFFENSE 
Before you can convict the defendant of the offense of 
CRIMINAL TRESPASS 
you must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the 
following elements of that offense. 
1. That defendant entered unlawfully on property, 
2. That at the time, he intended to cause damage to 
property or intended to commit a crime, and 
3. That such occurred in Layton City on October 3, 1992• 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and all of the 
essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your 
duty to convict the defendant. On the other hand, if the evidence has failed 
to so establish one or more of said elements then you should find the 
defendant not guilty. 
No. f 1 
SELF DEFENSE 
You are instructed that an individual may, in self 
defense, use that amount of force which appears to be 
reasonably necessary, under the circumstances, for 
protection against a threatened injury. This privilege to 
use force and violence in self defense ceases after the 
assailanat is helpless, or all danger is clearly past. 
NO. i^  
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE 
A person charged with an offense is presumed to be innocent 
until he is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
presumption of innocence is not a mere form to be disregarded 
by the jury at pleasure, but is a substantial, essential part 
of the law and is binding upon the jury. This presumption is a 
humane provision of the law, intended, so far as human agency 
is capable, to guard against the danger of an innocent person 
being unjustly punished. 
The presumption of innocence must continue^ to prevail in 
the minds of the jury unless and until the jury is satisfied 
beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant. 
NO. B. 
PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT 
You have been instructed that the burden is upon 
to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof 
beyond reasonable doubt does not require proof to an absolute 
certainty. A reasonable doubt is one based on reason, one 
which is reasonable in view of all the evidence. It is not a 
doubt which is merely fanciful or imaginary or based on wholly 
speculative possibility. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is 
that degree of proof which satisfies the mind, convinces the 
understanding of those who are bound to act conscientiously 
upon it and obviates all reasonable doubt, A reasonable doubt 
is a doubt which reasonable men and women would entertain, and 
it must arise from the evidence or the lack of evidence in this 
case. 
NO. 
JURY TO DETERMINE WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE, 
CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES AND FACTS 
You are the sole judges of the weight of the evidence, the 
credibility of the witnesses and the facts. In considering the 
testimony of a witness you may consider his appearance and 
demeanor, his apparent frankness and candor, or the want of it; 
his opportunity to observe, his ability to understand and his 
capacity to remember. You may consider the interest, if any is 
shown, which any witness may have in the result of the trial; 
and also any bias he may have, or any motive or probable motive 
which any witness may have to testify for or against either 
party. 
If you believe any witness has wilfully testified falsely, 
as to any material fact in the case, you are at liberty to 
disregard the whole of the testimony of such witness, except as 
he may have been corroborated by other credible witnesses or 
credible evidence. You are not bound to believe all that the 
witnesses may have testified to nor are you bound to believe 
any witness; you may believe one witness as against many, or 
many as against one. In the light of the above observation it 
is your privilege to judge the weight to be given to the 
testimony of the witnesses and to determine what the facts are. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
DIRECT AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
Evidence admitted in court can be either of two kinds or 
classifications: direct evidence or circumstantial 
evidence. 
If a person were to- smell, taste, feel, hear or see an act, 
incident, event or condition with one or more of his or her 
physical senses and later describe it as a witness in court, 
that would be direct evidence. All other evidence is 
circumstantial evidence. 
The law makes no distinction between these two kinds of 
evidence as to their usefulness or value in court 
proceedings, but respects each for such convincing force as 
it may carry and accepts each as a reasonable method of 
proof. Both may be considered by you in arriving at a 
verdict. 
NO. lb 
POSSIBLE SENTENCE NOT TO BE CONSIDERED 
In arriving at a verdict in this case you should not 
consider or discuss what sentence or punishment defendant would 
receive if convicted. Deciding what sentence is appropriate is 
a function of the court, and it generally makes that 
determination with the help of other agencies. Many factors 
bear on the sentence to be imposed in the event of a 
conviction, and you should not concern yourselves with that 
aspect of the case. 
NO. I I 
DEFENDANT IS COMPETENT WITNESS 
The defendant is a competent witness in his own behalf, and 
the fact that he is charged with the commission of an offense 
should not be regarded by you as tending to impeach or 
discredit his testimony. However, in weighing his testimony 
you make take into consideration his interest in the matter and 
give his testimony the same fair and impartial consideration 
you are obliged to give to all of the evidence in the case. 
NO. 
ATTITUDE OF JUDGE NOT TO INFLUENCE JURY 
If the court has said or done anything during this trial 
which has suggested to you that it is inclined to favor the 
claims or position of either party, you should not permit 
yourselves to be influenced by it. 
The court has not intended to indicate any opinion as to 
which witnesses are or are not worthy of belief, or as to which 
party should prevail. If any expression has seemed to 
indicated any opinion relating to any of these matters, you 
should disregard it, because you are the exclusive judges of 
the facts. 
NO. 
ADMITTED EVIDENCE, STATEMENTS OF COUNSEL OR A PARTY 
In arriving at a verdict, you should consider only evidence 
admitted during the trial, and should weigh the evidence 
fairly, impartially and conscientiously. You should not 
consider or be influenced by evidence offered but not admitted, 
or by evidence stricken out by the court. You should not 
consider or be influenced by statements of counsel or a party 
as to what the evidence is unless it is stated correctly, or by 
any statement of facts not shown in evidence if any such has 
been or should hereafter be made. 
At times throughout the trial the court has been called 
upon to determine whether certain offered evidence should be 
admitted. You should not be concerned with the reasons for 
such rulings and should not draw any inferences from them. 
Whether offered evidence is admissible is a question of law. 
In admitting evidence to which an objection has been made, the 
court does not determine what weight should be given to such 
evidence, nor does it pass on the credibility of the witness. 
ZLO 
JURORS TO DELIBERATE AND AGREE IF POSSIBLE 
It is your duty as jurors to consult with one another and 
to deliberate, with a view to reaching an agreement, if you can 
do so without violence to your individual judgment. You each 
must decide the case for yourself, but should do so only after 
a consideration of the case with your fellow jurors. You 
should not hesitate to change an opinion j&f convinced that it 
is erroneous. However, you should not surrender your honest 
convictions concerning the effect or weight of evidence for the 
mere purpose of returning a verdict or solely because of the 
opinion of the other jurors. 
NO.__J2L/__ 
CONSIDER ALL TOGETHER 
These instructions, though numbered separately, are to be 
considered and construed as one connected whole. Each 
instruction should be read and understood in reference to and 
as a part of the entire group of instructions and not as though 
any one sentence or instruction separately were intended to 
state the whole law of the case upon any particular point. 
Moreover, the order in which the instructions are given has no 
significance as their relative importance. 
No. ^ - ^ 
JURY TO APPOINT FOREPERSON 
CONCURRENCE OF ALL JURORS 
FOREPERSON SIGNS VERDICT 
When you retire to deliberate you should appoint one of 
your number as foreperson. Your verdict must be in writing, signed 
by your foreperson and when found must be returned by you into 
court. 
Your verdict in this case must be: 
Guilty Of CRUELTY TO ANIMALS 
as charged in the Information, or not quilty; as your deliberations 
may result. 
Guilty Of CRIMINAL TRESPASS 
as charged in the information, or not guilty; as your deliberations 
may result. 
This being a criminal case it requires a unanimous concurrence 
of all the jurors to find a verdict. 
Dated this ^-*? day of N " A ^ - 1 9 ^ . 
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
County of Davis, Layton Department 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through, 
LAYTON CITY 
plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT D. ALSTON 
Defendant-
VERDICT 
921001243 
We the jurors in the above case, find the defendant, 
(1) Guilty as charged, 
&)—Nut-SirrHy--
or ) CRUELTY TO ANIMALS 
4+)—Guilty as charged, or ) 
(2) Not Guilty 
CRIMINAL TRESPASS 
Dated /-Z9-Z-3 
